\u00cen timpul pandemiei COVID-19, China a efectuat un experiment masiv pentru a vedea dac\u0103 este posibil s\u0103 limiteze transmiterea acestui virus \u00een interiorul \u021b\u0103rii \u0219i s\u0103 \u00eempiedice p\u0103trunderea lui \u00een \u021bar\u0103 de c\u0103tre c\u0103l\u0103torii din str\u0103in\u0103tate. Pe m\u0103sur\u0103 ce evenimentele s-au derulat, abordarea a devenit cunoscut\u0103 sub numele de \"strategia COVID zero\". A func\u021bionat? R\u0103spunsul este \"oarecum\", dar a trebuit s\u0103 fie abandonat\u0103 din cauza consecin\u021belor care nu puteau fi prev\u0103zute la momentul \u00een care strategia a fost ini\u021biat\u0103.<\/p>\n
Dar, mai \u00eent\u00e2i, s\u0103 analiz\u0103m m\u0103surile specifice care au constituit \"strategia zero COVID\". Pentru aceasta, trebuie s\u0103 ne \u00eentoarcem cu mult \u00een urm\u0103, \u00een ianuarie 2020, c\u00e2nd China \u0219i-a dat seama c\u0103 trebuie s\u0103 raporteze apari\u021bia a 40 de cazuri neobi\u0219nuite de pneumonie sever\u0103 \u00een ora\u0219ul Wuhan. Acestea au fost primele cazuri raportate oficial ale pandemiei COVID-19 \u0219i, la foarte scurt timp, boala a fost transmis\u0103 de c\u0103l\u0103torii \u00een alte \u021b\u0103ri. Un coronavirus nou \u0219i inedit a fost identificat destul de rapid ca fiind cauza, dar nu se \u0219tia prea multe despre modul \u00een care acest virus va afecta popula\u021bia. \u00cen mod clar, acesta se transmitea de la persoan\u0103 la persoan\u0103, dar ce m\u0103suri puteau fi luate pentru a \u00eempiedica r\u0103sp\u00e2ndirea lui?<\/p>\n
Con\u0219tientiz\u00e2nd faptul c\u0103 c\u0103l\u0103torii interna\u021bionali r\u0103sp\u00e2ndesc boala de la un jude\u021b la altul, fiecare \u021bar\u0103 a instituit m\u0103suri pentru a opri sau a limita intrarea persoanelor \u00een \u021b\u0103rile lor. \u00cen aproape toate \u021b\u0103rile au fost instituite m\u0103suri precum interzicerea intr\u0103rii, impunerea test\u0103rii COVID \u00eenainte de \u00eembarcarea \u00een avioane sau instituirea carantinei obligatorii pentru c\u0103l\u0103torii care intr\u0103 \u00een \u021bar\u0103.<\/p>\n
\u00centre timp, odat\u0103 ce a fost disponibil un test pentru depistarea virusului, \u021b\u0103rile au ini\u021biat m\u0103suri pentru a opri transmiterea intern\u0103, de exemplu, impun\u00e2nd distan\u021barea social\u0103, \u00eenchiderea institu\u021biilor publice, obligativitatea purt\u0103rii de m\u0103\u0219ti, autoizolare \u00een caz de \u00eemboln\u0103vire \u0219i \u00eendemnarea oamenilor s\u0103 se testeze.<\/p>\n
Introducerea unor vaccinuri eficiente \u0219i a unor noi tratamente care au redus dramatic complica\u021biile, cum ar fi spitalizarea, terapia intensiv\u0103 \u0219i decesul, au schimbat lucrurile. Pandemia a devenit mai u\u0219or de gestionat, iar necesitatea unor m\u0103suri drastice de restric\u021bionare a accesului c\u0103l\u0103torilor \u0219i de stopare a transmiterii locale a fost redus\u0103.<\/p>\n
P\u00e2n\u0103 la jum\u0103tatea anului 2022, cu segmente mari ale popula\u021biei imunizate prin vaccinare, un anumit nivel de toleran\u021b\u0103 pentru niveluri sc\u0103zute de transmitere a virusului, spitalizare \u0219i deces a permis \u00eentreruperea aproape tuturor m\u0103surilor de control timpurii.<\/p>\n
Deci, cum s-a descurcat China \u00een toate acestea?<\/p>\n
\u00cenc\u0103 de la \u00eenceput au fost luate m\u0103suri pentru a elimina aproape complet c\u0103l\u0103toriile aeriene interna\u021bionale, precum \u0219i c\u0103l\u0103toriile interne cu orice mijloc de transport. M\u0103surile de s\u0103n\u0103tate public\u0103, cum ar fi distan\u021barea social\u0103, limitarea circula\u021biei popula\u021biei, carantina \u0219i testarea extins\u0103 a COVID au fost puse \u00een aplicare cu o intensitate nemai\u00eent\u00e2lnit\u0103 \u00een alte \u021b\u0103ri. Scopul declarat a fost acela de a opri orice transmitere a virusului peste tot. Un concept de \"izolare\" a fost adesea aplicat unor \u00eentregi comunit\u0103\u021bi sau chiar ora\u0219e, astfel \u00eenc\u00e2t toate mi\u0219c\u0103rile \u0219i interac\u021biunile au fost oprite. Atunci c\u00e2nd testele au devenit disponibile, ora\u0219e \u00eentregi au fost supuse test\u0103rii COVID \u0219i carantinei ulterioare.<\/p>\n
\u00cen cazul \u00een care oamenii erau depista\u021bi pozitiv, exista riscul ca ace\u0219tia s\u0103 fie \u021binu\u021bi \u00een carantin\u0103 timp de s\u0103pt\u0103m\u00e2ni \u00eentr-o camer\u0103 de spital. Dac\u0103 mergea\u021bi la un magazin sau la un restaurant care fusese vizitat de o persoan\u0103 pozitiv\u0103 la COVID, vi se putea cere s\u0103 sta\u021bi mult timp \u00eentr-un centru de carantin\u0103 cu spa\u021bii de cazare reduse. Sau a\u021bi putea fi \u00eenchis \u00een propria locuin\u021b\u0103, f\u0103r\u0103 permisiunea de a ie\u0219i, nici m\u0103car pentru a v\u0103 asigura hrana. Acela\u0219i rezultat s-ar putea \u00eent\u00e2mpla dac\u0103 tocmai a\u021bi trecut pe l\u00e2ng\u0103 o persoan\u0103 infectat\u0103 pe strad\u0103.<\/p>\n
Dac\u0103 a\u021bi fost \u00eenchis \u00een carantin\u0103, a\u021bi fost adesea supus discrimin\u0103rii dup\u0103 eliberare.<\/p>\n
Testele au devenit omniprezente. \u00cen marile ora\u0219e precum Beijing, Shanghai sau Shenzhen, cu o popula\u021bie de zeci de milioane de locuitori, oamenii trebuiau s\u0103 fie testa\u021bi la fiecare dou\u0103 sau trei zile la cabine amplasate pe trotuar. Conformitatea era urm\u0103rit\u0103 prin intermediul codurilor de s\u0103n\u0103tate de pe telefonul mobil.<\/p>\n
Au fost introduse vaccinurile COVID produse \u00een China \u0219i au fost administrate peste 3 miliarde de doze. Cu toate acestea, studiile au ar\u0103tat c\u0103 cele mai frecvent utilizate vaccinuri au avut o eficacitate de 51% (CoronaVac) \u0219i 79% (Sinopharm), ceea ce este considerabil mai mic dec\u00e2t vaccinurile Moderna \u0219i Pfizer utilizate \u00een mod obi\u0219nuit \u00een multe alte \u021b\u0103ri.<\/p>\n
S\u0103 revenim la \u00eentrebarea ini\u021bial\u0103: au func\u021bionat toate aceste m\u0103suri dure?<\/p>\n
R\u0103spunsul este c\u0103 nu au existat focare sau \"valuri\" semnificative de infec\u021bie pe parcursul anilor 2020 \u0219i 2021. Consulta\u021bi acest tabel:<\/p>\n \u00cen total, China a raportat aproximativ 10,5 milioane de cazuri \u0219i 32.700 de decese p\u00e2n\u0103 la 5 ianuarie 2023. \u00cen aceea\u0219i perioad\u0103 de timp, SUA a \u00eenregistrat 101 milioane de cazuri \u0219i 1,1 milioane de decese.<\/p>\n De\u0219i fiabilitatea \u0219i acurate\u021bea datelor chineze\u0219ti sunt adesea puse sub semnul \u00eentreb\u0103rii, diferen\u021bele dintre cele dou\u0103 \u021b\u0103ri \u0219i rezultatele diferitelor strategii sunt considerabil diferite.<\/p>\n Dar este sustenabil\u0103 strategia zero a Chinei? Tocmai s-a rupt. \u00cen urm\u0103 cu c\u00e2teva s\u0103pt\u0103m\u00e2ni, \u00een ora\u0219ul Xinjiang, un incendiu \u00eentr-o cl\u0103dire de apartamente \u00eenchis\u0103 \u00een carantin\u0103 a ucis 10 persoane. Frustrarea acumulat\u0103 de popula\u021bie fa\u021b\u0103 de m\u0103surile restrictive de control a dat \u00een clocot. \u00cen multe ora\u0219e au avut loc demonstra\u021bii publice \u00een care s-a pus la \u00eendoial\u0103 necesitatea \u00eenchiderii continue \u0219i a testelor \u0219i carantinei extinse. Popula\u021bia a cerut s\u0103 se pun\u0103 cap\u0103t strategiei guvernamentale \"zero COVID\". Costurile economice ale restric\u021biilor severe (de exemplu, \u00eentreprinderi \u00eenchise, \u0219omaj etc.) au devenit, de asemenea, insuportabile.<\/p>\n La \u00eenceputul lunii decembrie 2021, China a revenit asupra strategiei sale de zero COVID, cu repercusiuni dramatice. Aproape toate m\u0103surile din strategia zero au fost suspendate aproape peste noapte. Ca urmare, China se confrunt\u0103 cu o cre\u0219tere f\u0103r\u0103 precedent a num\u0103rului de cazuri. De\u0219i datele sunt discutabile, exist\u0103 rapoarte care indic\u0103 o cre\u0219tere de aproape 50%, de la 15.161 de spitaliz\u0103ri noi pentru China continental\u0103 \u00een s\u0103pt\u0103m\u00e2na care s-a \u00eencheiat la 25 decembrie la 22.416 pentru s\u0103pt\u0103m\u00e2na care s-a \u00eencheiat la 1 ianuarie. Num\u0103rul oficial al deceselor este subestimat, dar crematoriile raporteaz\u0103 c\u0103 sunt inundate de cadavre.<\/p>\n De ce s-a \u00eent\u00e2mplat acest lucru? Putem specula c\u0103 o combina\u021bie de factori a contribuit la aceast\u0103 explozie a COVID. Pe de o parte, ridicarea brusc\u0103 a m\u0103surilor foarte restrictive a dus la o amestecare imediat\u0103 a persoanelor infectate \u0219i neinfectate, de exemplu, reunificarea familiilor, c\u0103l\u0103toriile \u00een alte ora\u0219e, adun\u0103rile publice etc. - toate acestea au crescut riscul de transmitere a virusului. \u00cen plus, o mare parte din popula\u021bie nu a fost protejat\u0103 din cauza vaccinurilor cu un nivel sc\u0103zut de eficacitate.<\/p>\n \u00cen cele din urm\u0103, ce \u00eenseamn\u0103 situa\u021bia actual\u0103 din China pentru toate celelalte \u021b\u0103ri? Pe de o parte, un val uria\u0219 de noi cazuri de COVID-19 va r\u0103sp\u00e2ndi orice nou\u0103 variant\u0103 a virusului pe m\u0103sur\u0103 ce popula\u021bia chinez\u0103 c\u0103l\u0103tore\u0219te la nivel interna\u021bional. Pe de alt\u0103 parte, un num\u0103r mare de transmitere a virusului ofer\u0103 virusului oportunitatea de a dezvolta noi variante. Dar, \u00een acest moment, Organiza\u021bia Mondial\u0103 a S\u0103n\u0103t\u0103\u021bii \u0219i oficialii din domeniul s\u0103n\u0103t\u0103\u021bii \u0219i din guvernele din \u00eentreaga lume \u00eencearc\u0103 s\u0103 evalueze riscul (riscurile) creat(e) de problema COVID-19 din China.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column] \u00cen timpul pandemiei COVID-19, China a efectuat un experiment masiv pentru a vedea dac\u0103 este posibil s\u0103 limiteze transmiterea acestui virus \u00een interiorul \u021b\u0103rii \u0219i s\u0103 \u00eempiedice p\u0103trunderea lui \u00een \u021bar\u0103 de c\u0103tre c\u0103l\u0103torii din str\u0103in\u0103tate. Pe m\u0103sur\u0103 ce evenimentele s-au derulat, abordarea a devenit cunoscut\u0103 sub numele de \"strategia COVID zero\". A func\u021bionat? R\u0103spunsul este un fel de [...]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":83478,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"\n During the COVID-19 pandemic, China conducted a massive experiment to see if it were possible to contain transmission of this virus within the country and keep it from getting into the country by travellers from abroad. As events unfolded, the approach became known as the \u201czero COVID strategy\u201d. Did it work? The answer is sort of but it had to be abandoned due to consequences that could not be predicted when the strategy was started.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But first, let\u2019s look at the specific measures that made up the \u201czero COVID strategy\u201d. For that, we have to go way back to January 2020 when China realized that they had to report the occurrence of 40 unusual cases of severe pneumonia in the city of Wuhan. They were the first officially reported cases of the COVID-19 pandemic, and very shortly, the disease was carried by travellers to other countries. A new and novel coronavirus was identified rather rapidly as the cause, but little was known about how this virus would affect the population. Clearly, it was transmitted from person-to-person, but what measures could be taken to stop it from spreading?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Realizing that international travellers were spreading the disease from county to country, individual countries instituted measures to stop or limit people from entering their countries. Measures such as banning entry, or requiring COVID testing before boarding aeroplanes, or establishing mandatory quarantine for entering travellers were established in nearly all countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, once a test for the virus was available, countries initiated measures to stop internal transmission, e.g., mandating social distancing, closing public establishments, mandating mask-wearing, self-isolation if ill, and urging people to get tested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The introduction of effective vaccines and new treatments that dramatically reduced complications such as hospitalization, intensive care and death changed things. The pandemic became more manageable and the need for dramatic measures to restrict travellers from entering and for stopping local transmission was reduced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By mid-2022, with large segments of the population immunized through vaccination, a certain level of tolerance for low levels of transmission of the virus, hospitalization and death allowed for the discontinuance of almost all the early control measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So how did China fare in all of this?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Early on, steps were taken to nearly eliminate international air travel as well as domestic travel by any means of transportation. The public health measures such as social distancing, limitations on population movement, quarantine and extensive COVID testing were implemented with an intensity not seen in other countries. The stated goal was to stop all transmission of the virus everywhere. A \u201clockdown\u201d concept was often applied to entire communities or even cities, such that all movement and interactions were stopped. When testing became available, entire cities were submitted to COVID testing and subsequent quarantine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If people tested positive, there was a risk that they would be quarantined for weeks in a hospital room. If you went to a store or restaurant that had been visited by a COVID-positive person, you could be required to stay at a quarantine centre with sparse accommodations for a long time. Or you might be locked up in your own home without permission to leave, even to secure food. The same result could happen if you just passed an infected person on the street.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you had been locked up in quarantine, you were often subjected to discrimination after your release.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Testing became ubiquitous. In large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen with populations of tens of millions of people, people were required to be tested every two or three days at sidewalk booths. Compliance was tracked through health codes on your cell phone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chinese-produced COVID vaccines were introduced and more than 3 billion doses were administered. However, studies showed that the most commonly used vaccines were 51% effective (CoronaVac) and 79% effective (Sinopharm) which is considerably lower than the commonly used Moderna and Pfizer vaccines in many other countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Back to the original question: did all these harsh measures work?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The answer is that there were no significant outbreaks or \u201cwaves\u201d of infection throughout 2020 and 2021. Check out this table:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, China reported approximately 10.5 million cases and 32,700 deaths through 5 January 2023. In the same time period, the USA recorded 101 million cases and 1.1 million deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although the reliability and accuracy of Chinese data are often questioned, differences between the two countries and the results of their different strategies are considerably different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But is China\u2019s zero strategy sustainable? It just broke. Several weeks ago, in the city of Xinjiang, a fire in a locked quarantined apartment building killed 10 people. Accumulated frustration in the population with the restrictive control measures boiled over. There were public demonstrations in many cities questioning the need for ongoing lockdowns and extensive testing and quarantine. The population demanded the end to the government\u2019s zero COVID strategy. The economic costs of severe restrictions (e.g., closed businesses, unemployment, etc.) also have become unbearable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In early December 2021, China reversed its zero COVID strategy with dramatic repercussions. Nearly all of the measures in the zero strategy were suspended almost overnight. As a result, China is experiencing an unprecedented surge in cases. Although the data are questionable, there are reports of almost a 50% increase, from 15,161 new hospitalizations for mainland China during the week ending December 25 to 22,416 for the week ending January 1. The official death count is underreported but crematoria report that they are inundated with bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Why did this happen? We can speculate that a combination of factors contributed to this explosion of COVID. On one hand, the sudden lifting of very restrictive measures led to an immediate mixing of infected and uninfected people, e.g., the reunification of families, travel to other cities, public gatherings, etc. \u2013 all of which increased the risk of transmission of the virus. In addition, large portions of the population were not protected due to vaccines with low levels of effectiveness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, what does the current China situation mean for all the other countries? On one hand, a huge wave of new COVID-19 cases will spread any new virus variants as the Chinese population travels internationally. In addition, large numbers of virus transmission provide the virus with opportunities to develop new variants. But right now, the World Health Organization and health and government officials worldwide are trying to assess the risk(s) created by China\u2019s COVID-19 problem.<\/p>\n","_et_gb_content_width":"","inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[155,156,20],"tags":[108,109,145,112,113,22,229],"yoast_head":"\n\n\n
\n \u021aara<\/td>\n Num\u0103rul de cazuri la 100.000 de persoane<\/td>\n Num\u0103rul de decese la 100.000 de persoane<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n China<\/td>\n 75<\/td>\n 2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n SUA<\/td>\n 30,400<\/td>\n 331<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\t[\/et_pb_row]
\n\t\t[\/et_pb_section]<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Country<\/td> Number of Cases per100,000 People<\/td> Number of Deaths peer100,000 people<\/td><\/tr> China<\/td> 75<\/td> 2<\/td><\/tr> USA<\/td> 30,400<\/td> 331<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n