Under covid-19-pandemien gjennomf\u00f8rte Kina et omfattende eksperiment for \u00e5 se om det var mulig \u00e5 begrense spredningen av viruset i landet og hindre at det kom inn i landet via reisende fra utlandet. Etter hvert som hendelsene utviklet seg, ble tiln\u00e6rmingen kjent som \"null COVID-strategien\". Fungerte den? Svaret er p\u00e5 en m\u00e5te, men den m\u00e5tte oppgis p\u00e5 grunn av konsekvenser som ikke kunne forutses da strategien ble iverksatt.<\/p>\n
Men la oss f\u00f8rst se p\u00e5 de spesifikke tiltakene som utgjorde \"null COVID-strategien\". For det m\u00e5 vi g\u00e5 helt tilbake til januar 2020 da Kina inns\u00e5 at de m\u00e5tte rapportere forekomsten av 40 uvanlige tilfeller av alvorlig lungebetennelse i byen Wuhan. Dette var de f\u00f8rste offisielt rapporterte tilfellene av covid-19-pandemien, og i l\u00f8pet av kort tid ble sykdommen overf\u00f8rt av reisende til andre land. Et nytt og ukjent koronavirus ble ganske raskt identifisert som \u00e5rsaken, men man visste lite om hvordan dette viruset ville p\u00e5virke befolkningen. Det var klart at det ble overf\u00f8rt fra person til person, men hvilke tiltak kunne iverksettes for \u00e5 hindre at det spredte seg?<\/p>\n
Da de inns\u00e5 at internasjonale reisende spredte sykdommen fra land til land, innf\u00f8rte enkelte land tiltak for \u00e5 hindre eller begrense innreise. Tiltak som innreiseforbud, krav om covid-19-testing f\u00f8r ombordstigning p\u00e5 fly eller obligatorisk karantene for innreisende ble innf\u00f8rt i nesten alle land.<\/p>\n
I mellomtiden, s\u00e5 snart en test for viruset var tilgjengelig, iverksatte landene tiltak for \u00e5 stoppe intern smitte, f.eks. p\u00e5bud om sosial distansering, stenging av offentlige institusjoner, p\u00e5bud om bruk av munnbind, selvisolasjon ved sykdom og oppfordring til \u00e5 teste seg.<\/p>\n
Innf\u00f8ringen av effektive vaksiner og nye behandlinger som dramatisk reduserte komplikasjoner som sykehusinnleggelse, intensivbehandling og d\u00f8dsfall, endret situasjonen. Pandemien ble mer h\u00e5ndterbar, og behovet for dramatiske tiltak for \u00e5 hindre reisende i \u00e5 komme inn og for \u00e5 stanse lokal smitte ble redusert.<\/p>\n
I midten av 2022, med store deler av befolkningen immunisert gjennom vaksinasjon, ble det oppn\u00e5dd en viss toleranse for lave niv\u00e5er av virusoverf\u00f8ring, sykehusinnleggelse og d\u00f8dsfall som gjorde det mulig \u00e5 avvikle nesten alle de tidlige kontrolltiltakene.<\/p>\n
S\u00e5 hvordan klarte Kina seg i alt dette?<\/p>\n
Tidlig ble det iverksatt tiltak for nesten \u00e5 eliminere internasjonale flyreiser s\u00e5 vel som innenlandsreiser med alle transportmidler. Folkehelsetiltak som sosial distansering, begrensninger i befolkningens bevegelsesfrihet, karantene og omfattende COVID-testing ble iverksatt med en intensitet som ikke er sett i andre land. Det uttalte m\u00e5let var \u00e5 stanse all overf\u00f8ring av viruset overalt. Et \"lockdown\"-konsept ble ofte brukt p\u00e5 hele lokalsamfunn eller til og med byer, slik at all bevegelse og samhandling ble stanset. Da testing ble tilgjengelig, ble hele byer testet for covid-19 og deretter satt i karantene.<\/p>\n
Hvis folk testet positivt, var det en risiko for at de ville bli satt i karantene i flere uker p\u00e5 et sykehusrom. Hvis du gikk til en butikk eller restaurant som hadde hatt bes\u00f8k av en covid-positiv person, kunne du bli p\u00e5lagt \u00e5 oppholde deg p\u00e5 et karantenesenter med sparsom innkvartering i lang tid. Eller du kan bli innel\u00e5st i ditt eget hjem uten tillatelse til \u00e5 forlate det, selv for \u00e5 skaffe deg mat. Det samme kan skje hvis du bare passerer en smittet person p\u00e5 gaten.<\/p>\n
Hvis du hadde v\u00e6rt innel\u00e5st i karantene, ble du ofte utsatt for diskriminering etter l\u00f8slatelsen.<\/p>\n
Testing ble allestedsn\u00e6rv\u00e6rende. I store byer som Beijing, Shanghai og Shenzhen, med titalls millioner innbyggere, ble folk p\u00e5lagt \u00e5 teste seg hver andre eller tredje dag i boder p\u00e5 fortauet. Overholdelse ble sporet gjennom helsekoder p\u00e5 mobiltelefonen.<\/p>\n
Kinesiskproduserte COVID-vaksiner ble introdusert, og mer enn 3 milliarder doser ble administrert. Studier viste imidlertid at de mest brukte vaksinene var 51% effektive (CoronaVac) og 79% effektive (Sinopharm), noe som er betydelig lavere enn de vanligste Moderna- og Pfizer-vaksinene i mange andre land.<\/p>\n
Tilbake til det opprinnelige sp\u00f8rsm\u00e5let: virket alle disse strenge tiltakene?<\/p>\n
Svaret er at det ikke var noen betydelige utbrudd eller \"b\u00f8lger\" av smitte i 2020 og 2021. Se denne tabellen:<\/p>\n Samlet sett rapporterte Kina om ca. 10,5 millioner tilfeller og 32 700 d\u00f8dsfall fram til 5. januar 2023. I samme periode registrerte USA 101 millioner tilfeller og 1,1 millioner d\u00f8dsfall.<\/p>\n Selv om det ofte stilles sp\u00f8rsm\u00e5l ved p\u00e5liteligheten og n\u00f8yaktigheten til kinesiske data, er forskjellene mellom de to landene og resultatene av deres ulike strategier sv\u00e6rt forskjellige.<\/p>\n Men er Kinas nullstrategi b\u00e6rekraftig? Den har nettopp brutt sammen. For noen uker siden omkom 10 mennesker i en brann i en avstengt boligblokk i byen Xinjiang. Akkumulert frustrasjon i befolkningen over de restriktive kontrolltiltakene kokte over. Det var offentlige demonstrasjoner i mange byer der det ble stilt sp\u00f8rsm\u00e5l ved behovet for p\u00e5g\u00e5ende nedstengninger og omfattende testing og karantene. Befolkningen krevde en slutt p\u00e5 regjeringens null COVID-strategi. De \u00f8konomiske kostnadene ved strenge restriksjoner (f.eks. stengte virksomheter, arbeidsledighet osv.) har ogs\u00e5 blitt uutholdelige.<\/p>\n I begynnelsen av desember 2021 reverserte Kina sin nullstrategi mot covid-19 med dramatiske konsekvenser. Nesten alle tiltakene i nullstrategien ble suspendert nesten over natten. Som et resultat opplever Kina en enest\u00e5ende \u00f8kning i tilfeller. Selv om dataene er tvilsomme, rapporteres det om en \u00f8kning p\u00e5 nesten 50%, fra 15 161 nye sykehusinnleggelser for fastlands-Kina i l\u00f8pet av uken som endte 25. desember til 22 416 for uken som endte 1. januar. Det offisielle d\u00f8dstallet er underrapportert, men krematoriene rapporterer at de oversv\u00f8mmes av lik.<\/p>\n Hvorfor skjedde dette? Vi kan spekulere i at en kombinasjon av faktorer bidro til denne eksplosjonen av covid-19. P\u00e5 den ene siden f\u00f8rte den plutselige opphevelsen av sv\u00e6rt restriktive tiltak til en umiddelbar blanding av smittede og usmittede mennesker, f.eks. gjenforening av familier, reiser til andre byer, offentlige sammenkomster osv. - som alle \u00f8kte risikoen for overf\u00f8ring av viruset. I tillegg var store deler av befolkningen ikke beskyttet p\u00e5 grunn av vaksiner med lav effektivitet.<\/p>\n Til slutt, hva betyr den n\u00e5v\u00e6rende situasjonen i Kina for alle andre land? P\u00e5 den ene siden vil en enorm b\u00f8lge av nye covid-19-tilfeller spre eventuelle nye virusvarianter n\u00e5r den kinesiske befolkningen reiser internasjonalt. I tillegg gir et stort antall virusoverf\u00f8ringer viruset muligheter til \u00e5 utvikle nye varianter. Men akkurat n\u00e5 pr\u00f8ver Verdens helseorganisasjon og helse- og myndighetspersoner over hele verden \u00e5 vurdere risikoen(e) som f\u00f8lge av Kinas covid-19-problem.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column] Under covid-19-pandemien gjennomf\u00f8rte Kina et stort eksperiment for \u00e5 se om det var mulig \u00e5 begrense smitten av dette viruset i landet og hindre at det kom inn i landet via reisende fra utlandet. Etter hvert som hendelsene utviklet seg, ble tiln\u00e6rmingen kjent som \"null covid-19-strategien\". Fungerte den? Svaret er p\u00e5 en m\u00e5te [...]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":83478,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"\n During the COVID-19 pandemic, China conducted a massive experiment to see if it were possible to contain transmission of this virus within the country and keep it from getting into the country by travellers from abroad. As events unfolded, the approach became known as the \u201czero COVID strategy\u201d. Did it work? The answer is sort of but it had to be abandoned due to consequences that could not be predicted when the strategy was started.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But first, let\u2019s look at the specific measures that made up the \u201czero COVID strategy\u201d. For that, we have to go way back to January 2020 when China realized that they had to report the occurrence of 40 unusual cases of severe pneumonia in the city of Wuhan. They were the first officially reported cases of the COVID-19 pandemic, and very shortly, the disease was carried by travellers to other countries. A new and novel coronavirus was identified rather rapidly as the cause, but little was known about how this virus would affect the population. Clearly, it was transmitted from person-to-person, but what measures could be taken to stop it from spreading?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Realizing that international travellers were spreading the disease from county to country, individual countries instituted measures to stop or limit people from entering their countries. Measures such as banning entry, or requiring COVID testing before boarding aeroplanes, or establishing mandatory quarantine for entering travellers were established in nearly all countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, once a test for the virus was available, countries initiated measures to stop internal transmission, e.g., mandating social distancing, closing public establishments, mandating mask-wearing, self-isolation if ill, and urging people to get tested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The introduction of effective vaccines and new treatments that dramatically reduced complications such as hospitalization, intensive care and death changed things. The pandemic became more manageable and the need for dramatic measures to restrict travellers from entering and for stopping local transmission was reduced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By mid-2022, with large segments of the population immunized through vaccination, a certain level of tolerance for low levels of transmission of the virus, hospitalization and death allowed for the discontinuance of almost all the early control measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So how did China fare in all of this?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Early on, steps were taken to nearly eliminate international air travel as well as domestic travel by any means of transportation. The public health measures such as social distancing, limitations on population movement, quarantine and extensive COVID testing were implemented with an intensity not seen in other countries. The stated goal was to stop all transmission of the virus everywhere. A \u201clockdown\u201d concept was often applied to entire communities or even cities, such that all movement and interactions were stopped. When testing became available, entire cities were submitted to COVID testing and subsequent quarantine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If people tested positive, there was a risk that they would be quarantined for weeks in a hospital room. If you went to a store or restaurant that had been visited by a COVID-positive person, you could be required to stay at a quarantine centre with sparse accommodations for a long time. Or you might be locked up in your own home without permission to leave, even to secure food. The same result could happen if you just passed an infected person on the street.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you had been locked up in quarantine, you were often subjected to discrimination after your release.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Testing became ubiquitous. In large cities such as Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen with populations of tens of millions of people, people were required to be tested every two or three days at sidewalk booths. Compliance was tracked through health codes on your cell phone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chinese-produced COVID vaccines were introduced and more than 3 billion doses were administered. However, studies showed that the most commonly used vaccines were 51% effective (CoronaVac) and 79% effective (Sinopharm) which is considerably lower than the commonly used Moderna and Pfizer vaccines in many other countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Back to the original question: did all these harsh measures work?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The answer is that there were no significant outbreaks or \u201cwaves\u201d of infection throughout 2020 and 2021. Check out this table:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, China reported approximately 10.5 million cases and 32,700 deaths through 5 January 2023. In the same time period, the USA recorded 101 million cases and 1.1 million deaths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although the reliability and accuracy of Chinese data are often questioned, differences between the two countries and the results of their different strategies are considerably different.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But is China\u2019s zero strategy sustainable? It just broke. Several weeks ago, in the city of Xinjiang, a fire in a locked quarantined apartment building killed 10 people. Accumulated frustration in the population with the restrictive control measures boiled over. There were public demonstrations in many cities questioning the need for ongoing lockdowns and extensive testing and quarantine. The population demanded the end to the government\u2019s zero COVID strategy. The economic costs of severe restrictions (e.g., closed businesses, unemployment, etc.) also have become unbearable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In early December 2021, China reversed its zero COVID strategy with dramatic repercussions. Nearly all of the measures in the zero strategy were suspended almost overnight. As a result, China is experiencing an unprecedented surge in cases. Although the data are questionable, there are reports of almost a 50% increase, from 15,161 new hospitalizations for mainland China during the week ending December 25 to 22,416 for the week ending January 1. The official death count is underreported but crematoria report that they are inundated with bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Why did this happen? We can speculate that a combination of factors contributed to this explosion of COVID. On one hand, the sudden lifting of very restrictive measures led to an immediate mixing of infected and uninfected people, e.g., the reunification of families, travel to other cities, public gatherings, etc. \u2013 all of which increased the risk of transmission of the virus. In addition, large portions of the population were not protected due to vaccines with low levels of effectiveness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, what does the current China situation mean for all the other countries? On one hand, a huge wave of new COVID-19 cases will spread any new virus variants as the Chinese population travels internationally. In addition, large numbers of virus transmission provide the virus with opportunities to develop new variants. But right now, the World Health Organization and health and government officials worldwide are trying to assess the risk(s) created by China\u2019s COVID-19 problem.<\/p>\n","_et_gb_content_width":"","inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[155,156,20],"tags":[108,109,145,112,113,22,229],"yoast_head":"\n\n\n
\n Land<\/td>\n Antall tilfeller per 100 000 personer<\/td>\n Antall d\u00f8dsfall per 100 000 personer<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Kina<\/td>\n 75<\/td>\n 2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n USA<\/td>\n 30,400<\/td>\n 331<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\t[\/et_pb_row]
\n\t\t[\/et_pb_section]<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Country<\/td> Number of Cases per100,000 People<\/td> Number of Deaths peer100,000 people<\/td><\/tr> China<\/td> 75<\/td> 2<\/td><\/tr> USA<\/td> 30,400<\/td> 331<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n